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Abstrat. Many methods of analysing seurity protools have been pro-
posed, but most suh methods rely on analysing a protool running only
a nite network. Some, however|notably, data independene, the strand
spaes model, and the rank funtions model|an be used to prove or-
retness of a protool running on an unbounded network.
Rosoe and Broadfoot in [17℄ show how data independene tehniques
may be used to verify a seurity protool running on an unbounded net-
work. They also onsider a weakness inherent in the RSA algorithm,
disovered by Franklin and Reiter [3℄, and show that their data indepen-
dene approah annot deal with an intruder endowed with the ability
to exploit this weakness.
In this paper, we show that neither an the use of honest ideals in the
strand spaes model or the use of rank funtions in the CSP model be
easily adapted to over suh an intruder. In eah ase, the inequality tests
required to model the new intruder ause problems when attempting to
extend analysis of a nite network to over an unbounded network. The
results suggest that more work is needed on adapting the intruder model
to allow for ryptographi attaks.
Key words: ryptographi protools; rank funtions; strand spaes; data
independene; inequality tests; RSA; formal methods in seurity; seurity
models; seurity veriation.
1 Introdution
In [3℄, Franklin and Reiter present an attak on the RSA algorithm [15℄, allowing
deryption of a pair of distint enrypted messages, in the ase where the two
iphertexts stand in a known linear relation and are enrypted under the same
RSA publi key with a publi-key exponent of 3.
Suppose that we have two enrypted messages

1
= fmg
k

2
= fam + bg
k
and that we know a and b (with a 6= 0, and not both a = 1 and b = 0), and the
publi key k , but we do not know m. Suppose further that the exponent of k is
3, and that the modulus is n. Then we have
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3
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2
= (am + b)
3
mod n
We an reover m by observing that
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Coppersmith et al. generalise this attak in [1℄ to deal with an arbitrary
publi-key exponent e, but the omplexity of the attak is O(e log
2
e). They
laim that the attak should be pratial for exponents of up to 2
32
. In partiular,
it is eÆient with an exponent of 2
16
+1, a popular hoie in many appliations.
This paper explores the onsequenes of this attak for seurity protool
analysis. Speially, it investigates the feasibility of tailoring existing protool
veriation methods to allow an intruder to take advantage of the RSA attak
desribed above. For one of these methods|data independene|it has already
been shown by Rosoe and Broadfoot that the attak annot be inorporated
into the model without destroying the foundation on whih the model is built.
We demonstrate in this paper that two other urrent methods|rank funtions
for CSP models, and honest ideals for strand spaes|have surprisingly similar
problems in allowing for this strengthened intruder.
The struture of the paper is as follows. In the next setion, we desribe how
an intruder might use the RSA attak to break a seurity protool, and give a
brief overview of how one might attempt to model this apability when analysing
a protool. In Setion 3, we summarise Rosoe and Broadfoot's ndings with
regard to the RSA attak and the data independene model. Setion 4 desribes
the rank funtions model, and investigates the possibility of inluding the RSA
attak among the rank funtions intruder's weapons. Setion 5 deals with the
same question for the strand spaes model. Finally, in Setion 6, we sum up and
draw onlusions.
2 Exploiting the attak to break seurity protools
If onatenations of smaller protool messages are formed by simple onatena-
tions of the bit strings representing those messages, then the onept of a linear
relation between messages is lear: forming the ompound message x :y will in-
volve multiplying the value of x by 2
`(y)
and adding the value of y (where ``(y)'
denotes the length of the bit string representing y). The most natural formu-
lation of this is when m
1
= a:X :b and m
2
= :X :d , with the intruder already
knowing a, b,  and d (any of whih ould be null, but not both a =  and
b = d). For then
m
2
= 2
`(d) `(b)
(m
1
  b   2
`(X :b)
a) + d + 2
`(X :d)

An intruder who knows fm
1
g
k
and fm
2
g
k
for some known RSA key k with a
low enrypting exponent an make use of the attak given above to dedue the
value of X .
2.1 Modelling the new intruder
In eah of the three models under onsideration, the intruder has omplete on-
trol over the entire network, in the style of the Dolev-Yao model [2℄. The intruder
may
{ allow messages to be sent normally from agent to agent (but take note of
the ontents of the message in the proess);
{ interept messages and fail to deliver them;
{ onstrut and deliver spurious messages purporting to ome from anyone he
pleases.
In this last ase, he may send any message that he has already seen in the network
or that he an produe using only messages that he has seen. For instane, if he
has observed N
A
and N
B
as separate messages, then he may onstrut N
A
:N
B
from them and deliver this onatenation. (This onatenation operator is de-
ned to be assoiative.)
To allow for the extra intruder apability of exploiting the RSA weakness
when onduting protool analysis, one has to introdue a new dedution rule,
or type of penetrator strand, or the analogue in the model in question. With a
rank funtions approah, this will be an extra ` rule (explained more fully in
Setion 4):
ffa:X :bg
k
; f:X :dg
k
; a; b; ; dg ` X (a 6=  or b 6= d)
In the strand spaes model we would extend the denition of a penetrator strand
to inlude a new type L (see Setion 5):
L Low-exp RSA h fa:X :bg
k
; f:X :dg
k
;
  k ; a; b; ; d ;+X i for a; b; ; d ;X 2 A; a 6=  or b 6= d ; and k 2 K.
The data independene CSP model would ontain a new set of dedutions along
the following lines, desribing how the intruder, already in possession of messages
from a set Z , an extend his knowledge by utilising the RSA attak to dedue a
new message f . The set dedutions(Z ) is a set of ordered pairs of the form hS ;mi,
orresponding to S ` m in the rank funtions world (Setion 3):
dedutions(Z ) = fhfa; b; ; d ; k ; fa:f :bg
k
; f:f :dg
k
g; f i j
fa:f :bg
k
2 Z ; fb:f
0
:dg
k
0
2 Z ; f = f
0
; k = k
0
; a 6=  _ b 6= dg
This denition diers from the one given in [17℄ in three respets, none of great
moment:
1. The name given in [17℄ is `dedutions5'.
2. The key k has been erroneously omitted in [17℄ from the set of messages
required in order to make the dedution; it is here inluded.
3. Rosoe and Broadfoot give the dedution from fa:f g
k
and fb:f g
k
, and leave
the more general ase (with  and d inluded) for another (implied) dedu-
tion rule. Here, we give the full ase with fa:f :bg
k
and f:f :dg
k
, and assume
that the model will be onstruted so that a message of the form a:f an
be parsed as a:f :b with b = hi (the null message|and we naturally further
assume that an intruder an produe the null message whenever required).
Note the inequality tests in eah ase. Without them, the rule would degen-
erate: in the ase where a = b =  = d = hi, we would have rank funtions
dedutions of the form
ffX g
k
g ` X
and penetrator strands of the form
h fX g
k
;+X i
and a subset of dedutions(Z ) as
D(Z ) = fhfff g
k
; kg; f i j ff g
k
2 Zg
In other words, the intruder would be able to break every enryption.
The remainder of this paper deals with the issues involved in attempting to
inlude this new dedution rule or strand type in the analysis, and in partiu-
lar with the eet on proving orretness of a seurity protool running on an
unbounded network.
3 Data independene
Rosoe and Broadfoot [17℄ have demonstrated how one may analyse a seurity
protool running on a nite network, and then use Lazi's work on data inde-
pendene [11, 12℄ to extend the results to over unbounded networks.
Broadly speaking, a CSP proess P , parameterised by a data type T , is said
to be data independent with respet to T if the operation of P does not depend
in any way on T . The results that Lazi presents give onditions under whih
the abstrat data type T may be replaed with a small, onrete data type T
0
without aeting the whether P has partiular properties.
Rosoe and Broadfoot put forward the onept of a positive dedutive system.
A dedutive system is positive relative to a type T essentially if it treats all
members of T equivalently, and never requires inequality between two members
of type T in the set from whih the dedution is made. They then show that if
the intruder model is built over a positive dedutive system, it satises Lazi's
Positive Conjuntions of Equality Tests (PosConjEqT) property (or a slight
variant), whih requires that a proess should not perform expliit or impliit
equality tests exept for equality tests after whih the proess halts whenever
the test gives a negative result. For data independene tehniques to apply to a
model of a network running a seurity protool, we need the proess representing
the intruder, and also every proess representing an honest agent, to satisfy this
property.
The authors use this result to replae innite sets of nones and keys with
nite sets while ensuring that no attaks will be defeated by the replaement.
Model heking an then be used to show that there are no attaks on a small
system, and the data independene theorems provide the guarantee that there
will onsequently be no attaks on an unbounded system.
As Rosoe and Broadfoot make lear, however, giving the intruder the power
to exploit the weakness in low-exponent RSA, by allowing him to make use of
the set dedutions(Z ) dened earlier, results in an intruder proess that does
not satisfy this ondition. The intruder must hek that he holds two distint
enryptions in order to perform the attak; and this hek (the `a 6=  _ b 6= d '
in the denition of dedutions(Z )) violates the PosConjEqT ondition.
The neessity of the inequality hek in speifying the RSA attak makes
it impossible to work this new intruder apability into the data independene
model without invalidating the results.
4 Rank funtions
In this setion, we desribe the rank funtions approah to seurity protool
analysis, as set forth in [18, 9℄ and disuss the onsequenes of attempting to
strengthen the rank funtions intruder model to endow him with the ability to
use the attak on low-exponent RSA.
Some knowledge of CSP is assumed. For an introdution to CSP, see [10, 16,
19℄.
4.1 The network
The network onsidered in [9℄ onsists of a (usually innite) number of honest
agents, and one dishonest enemy. The behaviour of an agent J is desribed as
two CSP proess U
I
J
and U
R
J
, ontrolling respetively J 's ations as initiator and
responder. These user proesses will vary aording to the protool under on-
sideration; they will onsist of ommuniation along hannels trans , representing
transmission of a message, and re, representing reeption.
We shall write `U ' for the set of user identities on the network (inluding
identities of any dishonest agents), and `N ' for the set of nones that an be
used in protool runs.
We dene a `generates' relation `, writing `S ` m' to denote that the enemy
may onstrut message m if he possesses every message in the set S . If m and n
are messages, k is a key, and k
 1
is the inverse of k , then ` is the smallest
relation that satises
fm;ng ` m:n
fm:ng ` m
fm:ng ` n
fm; kg ` fmg
k
ffmg
k
; k
 1
g ` m
and also satises the losure onditions
m 2 S ) S ` m
(8 v 2 T  S ` v) ^ T ` m ) S ` m
The enemy (already in possession of a set of messages S ) is then desribed by
the reursive denition:
ENEMY (S ) =
trans?i?j ?m ! ENEMY (S [ fmg) 2
2
i;j ;S`m
re!i !j !m ! ENEMY (S )
Here the enemy an either reeive any message m transmitted by any agent i to
any other agent j along a trans hannel, and then at as the enemy with that
additional message; or pass any message m that it an generate from S to any
agent i along its re hannel, remaining with the same information S .
The whole network is then
NET = (
jjj
J2U
(U
I
J
jjj U
R
J
)) k ENEMY
For any given protool, there will be a (possibly innite) set of all atoms
that ould ever appear in a message of the protool. This set will enompass all
the user identities, nones and keys, and any other types of atom used in the
protool (for instane, timestamps). From this set we an onstrut the message
spae, usually denoted by `M', whih is the spae of all messages that an be
generated from these atoms.
We use `INIT ' to denote the set of atoms known to the enemy right from the
start. Some users will be under the ontrol of the enemy, and hene their seret
keys and all nones that they might produe will be in INIT ; other users will be
free of enemy ontrol, and so their seret keys and nones will not be in INIT.
4.2 Authentiation
For an authentiation protool to be orret, we usually require that a user B
should not nish running the protool believing that he has been running with
a user A unless A also believes that he has been running the protool with B .
(For a disussion of dierent forms of authentiation, see [18℄.) Conditions suh
as this an easily be expressed as trae speiations on NET, requiring that no
event from a set T has ourred unless another event from a set R has previously
ourred.
Denition 1. For sets R;T 2 M, we dene the trae speiation R preedes
T as
P sat R preedes T , 8 tr 2 traes(P)  (tr  R = hi ) tr  T = hi)
and note that, sine all proesses are prex-losed, this guarantees that any o-
urrene of t 2 T in a trae will be preeded by an ourrene of some r 2 R.
4.3 Rank funtions
Denition 2. A rank funtion, as dened in [7℄, is a funtion
 :M! f0; 1g
from the message spae to the binary-valued set f0; 1g. In addition, we dene
M

 
= fm 2M  (m) = 0g
M

+
= fm 2M  (m) = 1g
The point of a rank funtion is to partition the message spae into those
messages that the enemy might be able to get hold of, and those messages that
will ertainly remain out of his grasp. Anything with a rank of one will be
something that the enemy might get his hands on; anything of zero rank will be
unavailable to him.
4.4 The entral theorem from [9℄
For a proess P to maintain the rank with respet to a rank funtion , we
mean that it will never transmit any message m with (m) = 0 unless it has
previously reeived a message m
0
with (m
0
) = 0. Essentially, this means that
the proess will never give out anything seret unless it has already reeived a
seret message.
Denition 3. We say that P maintains  if
P sat re:U :U :M

 
preedes trans :U :U :M

 
Theorem 1. If, for sets R and T, there exists a rank funtion  :M! f0; 1g
satisfying
1. 8m 2 INIT  (m) = 1
2. 8S M;m 2 M  ((8m
0
2 S  (m
0
) = 1) ^ S ` m)) (m) = 1
3. 8 t 2 T  (t) = 0
4. 8J 2 U  USER
J
j[R ℄j Stop maintains 
then NET sat R preedes T.
The proof is omitted; the interested reader is advised to onsult [18, 9℄. For a
demonstration of how Theorem 1 an be used to verify seurity protools, see [9℄.
4.5 Strengthening the intruder model
The following protool is based on Lowe's xed version [13℄ of the Needham-
Shroeder Publi Key Protool [14℄:
Msg 1: a ! b : fa:nag
PK (b)
Msg 2: b ! a : fna:nb:bg
PK (a)
Msg 3: a ! b : fnbg
PK (b)
Msg 4: b ! a : nb
0
Msg 5: a ! b : fSK (a):na
0
:nb
0
g
PK (a)
The rst three messages of this protool are exatly the same as those of the
xed Needham-Shroeder Publi Key Protool. In Message 4, agent b sends a
new none nb
0
to the initiator; in the nal message, agent a pakages up his own
seret key, a new none of his hoie, and nb
0
, and sends all three to b enrypted
under his own publi key.
If the RSA weakness is not exploitable, this protool is seure. Nothing of
moment ours in the last two messages, exept for the sending of a long-term
seret key; and this seret key is never sent exept enrypted in suh a way that
this key itself is required in order to perform the deryption. (There may be type
aw attaks on this protool; but suh attaks are easily and heaply avoided by
following the implementation sheme reommended in [8℄.)
Even in the presene of an intruder who an exploit the RSA weakness, the
protool remains seure (see [6℄ for analysis of this protool on a small network,
in the presene of suh an intruder). No matter how many times the intruder
learns an enryption from a Message 5, he annot nd two with a known linear
relation between them, beause the value of na
0
will be dierent (and unknown)
in eah ase.
However, it is not possible to nd a rank funtion to prove that the protool
is seure in the presene of suh an intruder. Consider the following protool
run, in whih agent A initiates a run with the intruder, agent C :
Msg 1: A! C : fA:N
A
g
PK (C )
Msg 2: C ! A : fN
A
:N
C
:Cg
PK (A)
Msg 3: A! C : fN
C
g
PK (C )
Msg 4: C ! A : N
C
0
Msg 5: A! C : fSK (A):N
A
0
:N
C
0
g
PK (A)
In the fourth message, the intruder hooses some none N
C
0
to send to A, and
this is reeted in the message fSK (A):N
A
0
:N
C
0
g
PK (A)
that C reeives as a
result: A hooses a none N
A
0
, and sends it to C along with C 's none and A's
seret key, all enrypted under A's publi key (the inverse of whih C does not
hold).
Now, it is lear from the above sequene of messages that we must have
(fSK (A):N
A
0
:N
C
0
g
PK (A)
) = 1
for A is willing to send this message out at the end of the run: if the proess
representing A is to maintain the rank, then the nal message that it sends out
during this protool run must have a rank of one. But what if the intruder had
hosen a dierent none, in plae of N
C
0
? What if he had instead hosen N
C
00
?
Then A would have sent fSK (A):N
A
0
:N
C
00
g
PK (A)
instead. We must therefore
also have
(fSK (A):N
A
0
:N
C
00
g
PK (A)
) = 1
|despite the fat that, during the operation of the network, at most one of these
messages an be sent out. Agent A will hoose a dierent value for na
0
in eah
run, and will never use the same value twie; but beause C an send either N
C
0
or N
C
00
, eah of the above enryptions ould be (independently) available to the
intruder, and so eah of them must be given a rank of one. But now, of ourse,
our new dedution rule tells us that
n
fSK (A):N
A
0
:N
C
0
g
PK (A)
; fSK (A):N
A
0
:N
C
00
g
PK (A)
;N
C
0
;N
C
00
;PK (A)
o
` SK (A)
and so A's seret key must have a rank of one|as if the intruder ould learn
the seret key. He annot in fat learn it, beause he annot get hold of both of
these messages in order to exploit the weakness. If the intruder really ould get
hold of SK (A), then of ourse he ould masquerade as A as often as he pleased,
and the protool would be broken. The rank funtions model annot, it seems,
be extended to deal with the attak on low-exponent RSA beause its inability
to distinguish mutually exlusive possibles from ompossibles wreaks havo with
this type of dedution rule.
The root ause of this is the inequality test in the dedution rule. The failure
to distinguish a ase in whih either of two (but not both) messages an be sent
out from a ase in whih both an be sent out seems not to ause a problem when
inequality tests are not permitted in the ations of the agents or the intruder;
but with dedution rules suh as the RSA rule, where it is advantageous to the
intruder to possess two distint messages of the same type, this failure gives the
rank funtions model trouble with verifying some orret protools.
5 Strand spaes
We next turn to the strand spaes model, as desribed in [22, 24, 21, 23℄, and
ondut an analogous line of enquiry: an we t our strengthened intruder into
the strand spaes model without enountering similar diÆulties?
5.1 Basi denitions
A strand models the ations of an agent on the network, or an atomi ation
performed by the penetrator. (The penetrator in the strand spaes model or-
responds to the intruder in the data independene and rank funtions models.)
A regular strand represents a run of the protool onsidered from the point of
view of one of the agents involved. A penetrator strand models an atomi a-
tion performed by the penetrator; for instane, onatenating two messages that
he knows, or sending a message out over the network. The tehniques available
to the penetrator in the strand spaes model are essentially the same as those
available to the intruder in the rank funtions and data independene models.
Denition 4. We write `A' to denote the spae of messages that are ommuni-
able aross the network. An element t 2 A is alled a term.
Denition 5. The set of ryptographi keys is denoted by `K'; this set is a subset
of A.
Denition 6. The atomi messages that are not keys form the set T. This set
is a subset of A. The sets K and T are disjoint.
Denition 7. A strand is a sequene of signed terms. We write `+t ' to repre-
sent transmission of a term t, with reeption written as ` t '. A general strand
is denoted by `ht
1
; : : : ;t
n
i'.
A strand representing an honest agent models the transmissions and reeptions
involving that agent in a single run of the protool.
Denition 8. The signed terms of a strand are alled its nodes. The ith node
of a strand s is denoted by `hs ; ii'.
5.2 Strand spaes and bundles
A olletion of strands may be onsidered as a graph, with two edge types, )
and !, representing respetively onseutive terms on the same strand, and
ommuniation between two strands.
Denition 9. If n
i+1
immediately follows n
i
on the same strand, then we write
`n
i
)n
i+1
'.
Denition 10. If n
1
= +a and n
2
=  a for some term a 2 A then we write
`n
1
!n
2
'.
Denition 11. A strand spae is then a olletion of strands onsidered as a
graph ordered by )[!.
A bundle in the strand spae model orresponds to a trae of the whole
network in the rank funtions approah. It is a nite set of strands, ordered by
)[!, on whih ertain onditions are imposed to ensure that
{ reeption events never our unless the orresponding transmission event has
ourred;
{ whenever an agent starts a protool run, he starts from the beginning of the
protool;
{ there is no bakwards ausation; that is, there are no loops in the graph.
Denition 12. If C  (![)) is a nite set of edges, and N is the set of
nodes that appear on edges in C, then C will be alled a bundle if
{ whenever n
2
2 N and n
2
is a negative node, then there exists a unique
n
1
2 N with n
1
!n
2
2 C;
{ whenever we have n
2
2 N and n
1
)n
2
, then n
1
)n
2
2 C;
{ C is ayli.
5.3 Penetrator strands
The analogue of the ` relation in the rank funtions world is a type of strand
known as a penetrator strand. A penetrator strand represents a dedution that
the penetrator may make under `, with dierent types of penetrator strand
orresponding to dierent types of dedution. In addition, sine the penetrator
in the strand spaes model has no loal state, there will be a type of penetrator
strand to represent dupliating a term in order to be able to use it twie; and
sine every network message that is transmitted is always reeived by another
strand, we introdue one nal type of penetrator strand to model hearing and
disregarding a message.
Just as the rank funtions intruder starts by knowing everything in INIT , so
the penetrator will have some initial knowledge. However, in the strand spaes
model, only the keys known to the penetrator are stated: these keys form the
set K
P
.
Denition 13. A penetrator strand is one of the following:
M Text message h+ti for t 2 T.
F Flushing h x i for x 2 A.
T Tee h x ;+x ;+x i for x 2 A.
C Conatenation h x ; y ;+xyi for x ; y 2 A.
S Separation h xy ;+x ;+yi for x ; y 2 A.
K Key h+ki for k 2 K
P
.
E Enryption h k ; x ;+fxg
k
i for x 2 A, k 2 K.
D Deryption h fxg
k
; k
 1
;+x i for x 2 A, k 2 K.
This denition is parameterised by the set T .
Reall from Denition 12 that for eah negative node n
2
in a bundle there
must be exatly one positive node n
1
suh that n
1
!n
2
; that is, every reeption of
a message must be mathed to exatly one transmission. The purpose of strands
of type F is to allow the penetrator to `absorb' transmissions of messages that
he does not wish to use; strands of type T perform the orresponding ro^le of
repliating messages that the penetrator wants to transmit more than one.
Reent work on the strand spaes model in [4, 5℄ has dropped this require-
ment of mathed transmissions and reeptions, allowing ommuniations to be
sent to zero nodes, one node or many nodes. Consequently, the need for pen-
etrator strands of types F and T has been abrogated. This slightly simplies
the notation, but does not alter the expressive power of the language. Here, we
follow the notation of [21℄ and keep these types of penetrator strand; but this
deision does not aet the analysis.
5.4 Regular strands
A regular strand orresponds to a run of the protool by an honest agent, or
the ations of a trusted server. It will usually be, as is the ase in our model, a
spei instantiation of a strand template ontaining free variables. The formal
denition of a regular strand is very simple:
Denition 14. A regular strand is any strand that is not a penetrator strand.
5.5 Subterms and ideals
We sometimes wish to talk about the subomponents of a ompound message.
The onept in the strand spaes model that allows us to do so is that of a
subterm. The notation `t
1
 t
2
' will imply, informally speaking, that t
1
an be
found somewhere in the makeup of t
2
); but note that we shall not have k fmg
k
unless k m.
The  relation is dened in terms of ideals. Ideals in the strand spaes model
allow us to talk about all messages ontaining a partiular submessage, when
enryption is restrited to a partiular set of keys.
Denition 15. Let k  K be a set of keys, and I  A a set of terms. Then we
say that I is a k-ideal of A if
1. hg 2 I and gh 2 I whenever h 2 I and g 2 A;
2. fhg
k
2 I whenever h 2 I and k 2 k.
We write `I
k
[h℄' for the smallest k-ideal ontaining h. Similarly, if S is a set of
terms, then `I
k
[S ℄' denotes the smallest k-ideal that inludes S.
Denition 16. We say that h 
k
m if m 2 I
k
[h℄. When h 
K
m, we drop the
subsript and write simply `h m', and say that h is a subterm of m.
5.6 Honesty
A node is an entry point to a set if it transmits a term without having already
transmitted or reeived any term in the set.
Denition 17. If, for a node n of a strand s, and a set I  A,
{ n is a positive node;
{ the term of n is in I ;
{ no previous node on s has its term in I
then we say that n is an entry point to I .
The idea of an honest set is an important one. A set is honest relative to a
given bundle if the penetrator an never break into the set exept by pure uke:
either he guesses the right none (on an M strand), or he guesses the right key
(on a K strand).
Denition 18. A set I  A is honest relative to a bundle C if whenever a node
of a penetrator strand s is an entry point to I , then s is a strand of type M or
type K.
Although honesty is dened for sets in general, it is when the onepts of an
honest set and an ideal are onjoined that they are most powerful. The main
theorem from [21℄ gives onditions under whih an ideal is honest.
Theorem 2. Suppose
1. C is a bundle over A;
2. S  T [ K;
3. k  K;
4. K  S [ k
 1
.
Then I
k
[S ℄ is honest.
Proof. The proof is omitted; it may be found in [21℄.
5.7 Strengthening the intruder
Theorem 2 is the lynhpin of a utting-edge strand spae analysis (see [21℄ for
examples of the theorem in ation); and, in fat, strand spaes proofs prior to the
introdution of this theorem were also onduted along essentially these lines.
The proof of the theorem is by a ase-by-ase analysis of the possible types
of penetrator strand, demonstrating that for eah type, with the exeptions of
types M and K, no strand an provide an entry point to I
k
[S ℄.
Extending the strand spaes model to over the RSA attak will involve
introduing a new type of penetrator strand
L Low-exp RSA h fa:X :bg
k
; f:X :dg
k
;
  k ; a; b; ; d ;+X i for a; b; ; d ;X 2 A; a 6=  or b 6= d ; and k 2 K
modelling the penetrator's new-found ability to exploit the weakness. Before we
an use this extended model to prove orretness of seurity protools even in
the presene of our new penetrator, we are required to show that the standard
strand spaes results still hold good. In partiular, this means that we need to
extend the proof of Theorem 2 to inlude penetrator strands of type L.
This, sadly, annot be done. Let C be a bundle over A, and let S = fX ;K
 1
g,
with K 2 K, k = K n fKg and X 2 T. Now let a; b; ; d 2 T n S . The onditions
of Theorem 2 are now satised, and so we should have that I
k
[S ℄ is honest.
However, suppose that C ontains the strand
h fa:X :bg
K
; f:X :dg
K
; K ; a; b; ; d ;+X i
representing the penetrator's dedution of X by making use of the RSA attak.
Now the rst two terms lie outside the ideal, beause K =2 k; the next ve are
not in the ideal beause they are not ontained in S . But the last term, +X ,
is positive, and X 2 I
k
[S ℄. So this strand provides an entry point for I
k
[S ℄,
ontraditing the denition of honesty.
It appears, then, that there is no simple way to extend the strand spaes
model to over this RSA attak without falsifying the entral result used to
verify protools. It is, again, the impliit inequality test that lies at the root.
For the onept of an honest ideal aptures the notion of the set of messages
suh that it is undesirable to allow the penetrator to learn any of the messages
in the set: if the penetrator an pik up a single message from inside I
k
[S ℄, for
some suitable set k, he will be able to learn the values of some members of S .
Allowing for the RSA weakness would require speifying a set H suh that the
penetrator should be able to pik up no more than one message from H|or, in
other words, if he an learn two messages 
1
and 
2
from H , and we have that

1
6= 
2
, then he an make use of the attak. Inorporating this into the strand
spaes model would require substantial reworking of the basi tools of the trade;
and, in any ase, it is not at all lear how it ould be done.
6 Conlusion
The data independene model annot be easily adapted to allow the intruder to
take advantage of the weakness in low-exponent RSA. We have shown in this
paper that both the rank funtions method for CSP models, and the use of
honest ideals in the strand spaes model, suer from the same inexibility, and
that it is the impliit inequality heks that are the ause in eah ase.
The fat that all three models fail to allow for this attak, and all for the
same reason, suggests that the mehanisms by whih these three approahes to
seurity protool analysis manage to deal with unbounded networks have more
similarities than meet the eye.
Eah approah involves identifying an innite set of messages that an all be
treated in the same way. The data independene model requires a data type T
suh that replaing one member of T for another throughout the system should
not defeat any attaks. The rank funtions model identies sets of messages
suh that the intruder gains no more information from learning all members
of the set than he does from learning just one, and so simply keeps trak of
whether the intruder knows the whole set or none of it. The strand spaes model
operates in muh the same way: an honest ideal I
k
[S ℄ is the set of messages
any of whih an be used by the penetrator to learn something from the set
S ; and so the requirement is always to show that none of the messages in the
ideal an be piked up by the penetrator. What none of the models an allow
for is the idea that allowing the intruder to learn one of the messages might be
aeptable, whereas to reveal two (or more) will result in a breah of seurity|
or, more appropriately, that it is dangerous to allow the intruder to learn two
suh messages 
1
and 
2
if and only if 
1
6= 
2
. We simply annot deal with the
inequality test.
We suspet that Rosoe and Broadfoot's notion of a positive dedutive system
will aurately limit what an be analysed not just with the data independene
model, but with eah of the three models onsidered in this paper. Formalising
this idea within the rank funtions and strand spaes models, and proving that
positive dedutive systems do indeed dene the sope of what an be veried
using these models, is the subjet of ongoing researh.
We are interested to note that Stoller's approah [20℄ to identifying bounds on
the number of protool runs required for an attak an be extended to deal with
the inequality tests required for the attak on RSA onsidered here, under ertain
mild onditions on the nature of the protool under onsideration. This implies
that Stoller's method is dierent at a deeper level from the three approahes
onsidered in this paper, and gives hope that alternative tehniques for CSP
models and strand spaes might be developed that an handle inequality tests.
A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